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INTRODUCTION 
In the case of SB v HMA,1 the per curiam opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeal, delivered 
by Lord-Justice Clerk Carloway, held that any person who abducts a ‘pupil’ child2 may be 
charged with the crime of plagium.3 The crime of plagium is ‘an aggravated form of theft’.4 In 
Scotland, the crime of theft involves the wrongful and intentional appropriation of a corporeal 
thing which is owned by another person.5 Moveable corporeal things may be termed ‘goods’;6 
the ‘goods’ which are stolen in instances of plagium are prepubescent children. The 
aggravation in a charge of plagium arises as a result of the importance ascribed to the stolen 
object, not for any other reason.7 The child is consequently considered to be an object of 
‘property’ in the eyes of Scotland’s criminal law.8 This raises an uncomfortable question: Are 
children regarded as mere things according to the law of Scotland? 
The answer would appear to be, prima facie, a resounding ‘no’. If, as is generally 
asserted,9 the human body itself cannot is not regarded as a mere thing by law,10 one may 
reasonably presume that the living body of a child cannot be considered such. One may only 
make this presumption, however, if one eschews consideration of the illiberal roots of Scots 
                                                            
1 [2015] HCJAC 56 
2 Understood as a boy under the age of 14, or a girl under the age of 12: Hansard, Age of Legal Capacity 
(Scotland) Bill, HL Deb 01 July 1991 vol.530 cc866-82, p.879 
3 SB v HMA [2015] HCJAC 56, para.20 
4 Brouilliard v HM Advocate (2004) JC 176 
5 Sheriff Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, (3rd Edition) para.14.1 
6 Sale of Goods Act 1979 c.54, s.61(1) 
7 Downie v HMA (1984) SCCR 365, Sir Archibald Alison, Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland, (Oxford: 
W. Blackwood, 1832) , p.280 
8 See Rachel Wright (1808) Burnett App. VII; Mary Millar or Oates (1861) 4 Irv. 74; Downie v HMA (1984) 
SCCR 365 
9 See, for example, C v Advocate General for Scotland  2012 S.L.T 103, para.63, wherein Lord Brodie stated, 
uncritically and in passing, that there can be no proprietary rights in a human corpse.  
10 Per David M. Walker, Principles of Scottish Private Law, Book 1: Introductory and General, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988) p.4: This claim, first posited in connection to Scots law by Professor T.B Smith in Law 
and Professional Ethics, [1959] S.L.T (News) 245, is accepted as fact within the context of Anglo-American 
Common law systems, but may nevertheless be doubted in Scots law: See Jonathan Brown, Theft, Property 
Rights and the Human Body – A Scottish Perspective, [2013] JMLE 43 
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law.11 The contemporary crime of plagium is underpinned by the notion that pre-pubescent 
children, having no will of their own, are things held in the possession of – indeed, held as the 
property of – others.12 It was for this reason that the Institutional writer Hume provided plagium 
with a proprietary basis13 and for this reason that, in 1987, the Scottish Law Commission 
concluded that the continued existence of the crime of plagium remains ‘at odds with 
contemporary thinking’.14 In spite of the Law Commission’s report, plagium remains a 
common law crime in the 21st century. The ‘uncomfortable question’ posed at the end of the 
preceding paragraph consequently merits serious consideration. 
This article provides such consideration by examining the history of the crime of 
plagium and exploring its connection to the Scottish concept of ‘property’. It begins by defining 
‘property’, within the Scottish context, and thereafter analyses the connection between the 
historic crimen plagii, the crime of plagium in early Scots law and the crime as it is currently 
conceptualised. Thereafter, this paper addresses the chapter’s central question and seeks to 
argue that, at present, Scots law does doctrinally view children as no more than simple objects 
of property. 
The author acknowledges that this is an unsavoury conclusion. The article consequently 
concludes by analysing the contemporary crime of abduction before recommending that 
plagium ought to be abolished if, indeed, it is too late for the law to practically rediscover the 
non-proprietary roots of the crime. The crime of abduction has been described as ‘the crime of 
carrying off or confining a person forcibly, against his will and without lawful authority’.15 
                                                            
11 See Alan Rodger, Thinking about Scots Law, [1996] 1 Edinburgh L. Rev. 1, p.3; see also Robin Evans-Jones, 
Receptions of Law, Mixed Legal Systems and The Myth of the Genius of Scots Private Law, [1998] LQR 228 
12 Downie v HMA (1984) SCCR 365 
13 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting the Description and Punishment of Crimes, 
(Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1797),  p.84 
14 Scottish Law Commission Report on Child Abduction, February 1987 para.2.3 
15 Brouilliard v HM Advocate 2004 JC 176, LJG (Cullen) at para [18] 
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The criteria of this crime ostensibly appears to coincide with the essential elements of plagium, 
however, the way in which ‘abduction’ is framed treats the person who is taken as both a person 
and a victim.16 The crime of plagium, on the other hand, regards the ‘owner’ of the ‘stolen’ 
child as the victim and the child who is taken as no more than a mere piece of property. It 
consequently appears that the kidnapping of children is better dealt with under the law of 
abduction, rather than plagium. 
This argument cannot be called novel, as it finds support in a 1987 report of the Scottish 
Law Commission,17 yet, since the law has remained unchanged in the 28 years since the 
report’s publication, it is nevertheless necessary to reiterate it. In the 21st century, one must ask 
why the crime of plagium – and its resulting implications – continues to exist within the 
framework of contemporary Scottish criminal law, particularly when one considers the 
contemporary crime of abduction, recent statutory changes to the law and the court’s 
documented unwillingness to make use of the common law crime. As such, this paper 
ultimately submits that, since the courts have alluded that continued reference to the crime is 
unnecessary, there is no reason for Parliament to shy away from expressly abolishing the crime 
and ruling that children are never to be considered ‘property’ in the eyes of the law.  
 ‘PROPERTY’ AND CRIMES AGAINST IT 
 ‘Property law’, within the Scottish and the Civilian milieu,18 is the law pertaining to 
‘things’19 – the ius quod ad res pertinet.20 In law, an ‘owner’, or ‘proprietor’, can be understood 
                                                            
16 Scottish Law Commission Report on Child Abduction, February 1987 para.3.5 
17 Scottish Law Commission Report on Child Abduction, February 1987, chapter 3 
18 Scottish property law (ostensibly) remains ‘resolutely civilian’: David Carey-Miller, Malcolm Combe, 
Andrew Steven and Scott Wortley, National Report on the Transfer of Movables in Scotland, in Wolfgang Faber 
and Brigitta Lurger (Eds.), National Reports on the Transfer of Movables in Europe Volume 2: England and 
Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Cyprus, (Sellier, 2009) p.311 
19 Kenneth Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, (Buttersworth, 1993), p.1 
20 Gai Inst. 2. 8; J. Inst.2.2.12 
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as a legal person who enjoys a relationship of dominium with a thing (a res).21 This relationship 
confers a number of benefits on the proprietor, including the authority to lawfully possess the 
thing in question, to enjoy it and dispose of it.22 These benefits are ‘naturally unlimited’,23 
however they may be (indeed, in practice, they generally are) limited by operation of the law 
or by a private agreement brokered by the proprietor.24 Anything may be understood as 
‘property’ for the purposes of the positive law if it is categorised as a ‘thing’ by that law. 
Although some Anglo-American scholars have suggested that interpreting ‘property’ 
as the thing which is the object of rights may be ‘easily discredited by lawyers and philosophers 
for its awkwardness and incompleteness’,25 this claim stands at odds with the concept of 
‘property’ in the Civil law. Unlike in English law, wherein there is no defined concept of 
‘ownership’26 and the distinction between things ‘real’ and ‘personal’ rights enjoys little more 
than a ‘shadowy existence’,27 the Civilian tradition contemporaneously recognises ‘an 
unbridgeable divide’ between ‘real’ rights and ‘personal’ rights.28 ‘Ownership’, in Scots law, 
has been termed the ‘sovereign, or primary real right’ by Erskine29 and, likewise, modern 
French and South African law consider it to be ‘the most comprehensive real right’ which one 
                                                            
21 John Rankine, The Law of Land Ownership in Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1909), p.99 
22 Anstruther v Anstruther (1836) 14 S.272; Alves v Alves (1861) 23 D.712; Corporation of Glasgow v M’Ewan 
(1899) 2 F (H.L) 25, p.26 
23 George Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, (Berlin: Springer, 2012) p.126; John Rankine, 
The Law of Land Ownership in Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1909), p.99 
24 John Erskine of Carnock, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, (8th Edition) (J.B Nicholson, 1871) II.i.1 
25 J. W. Harris, Who Owns M y Body? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 16 (1) (1996), pp.11-12 
26 Jesse Wall, Being and Owning, (Oxford: OUP, 2015) p.20 
27 George Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007] Rabels Zeitschrift Vol 71 803, p.830 
28 See Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger and Another [2004] UKHL 8; particularly para.87. This distinction stemmed 
from the equally ‘unbridgeable division’ between actiones in rem et actiones in personam present in the 
classical Roman law: The Romans had no concept of ‘rights’ as we would understand them, however Professor 
Nicolas argued that parts of the ius quod actiones pertinent could be contemporaneously understood as 
pertaining to ‘rights’ – see Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962) 
p.100 
29 John Erskine of Carnock, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, (8th Edition) (J.B Nicholason, 1871) II.i.1 
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may have in a thing.30 It is therefore apparent that a ‘real’ right, in the Civilian tradition, refers 
specifically to a thing and its relationship with legal persons31 and not, as has been suggested 
by Common law commentators,32 the relationship between persons in respect of a thing.  
The law clearly recognises that corporeal and incorporeal things may be ‘owned’. With 
that said, some English academics are uncomfortable with the idea of incorporeal objects being 
categorised as ‘property’ and question whether or not intellectual property should be called 
such.33 Equally, some Romanist scholars claim that the Roman jurists had only corporeal things 
in mind when discussing the ius quod ad res pertinet.34 These claims are ultimately 
unsustainable. It is usual for Anglo-American lawyers to talk of ‘ownership’ of incorporeal 
things such as copyrights35 and patents36 when considering ‘property law’ (in spite of the 
theoretical absence of ‘ownership’ within the Common law’s lexicon)37 and there is English 
doctrinal authority which suggests that even ‘personal rights’ arising as a result of obligations 
                                                            
30 J.R.L Milton, Ownership, in Reinhard Zimmerman and Daniel Visser, Southern Cross: Civil Law and 
Common Law in South Africa, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) p.699; Françoise Moulin and Edwige Laforêt, 
Introduction au Droit, (Dunod, 2009), p.253 
31 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962) p.100 
32 See Simon Douglas, Property Rights in Human Biological Material, in Imogen Goold, Kate Greasley, 
Jonathan Herring and Loane Skene (Eds.), Persons Parts and Property: How Should We Regulate Human 
Tissue in the 21st Century, (Hart, 2014) ; Ngaire Naffine, The Legal Structure of Self-Ownership: Or The Self-
Possessed Man and the Woman Possessed, [1998] Journal of Law and Society 25(2) 193 at 197 
33 Simon Douglas, Property Rights in Human Biological Material, in Imogen Goold, Kate Greasley, Jonathan 
Herring and Loane Skene (eds.) Persons, Parts and Property: How Should We Regulate Tissue in the 21st 
Century?, (Hart Publishing, 2014) 
34 William W. Buckland, The Main Institutions of Roman Private Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1936) p.91; Rudloph Sohm, James Crawford Ledlie, Bernhard Erwin Grueber, The Institutes of Roman 
Law, (Gorgias Press, 2002) p.225 
35 See, for example, s.2(1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c.48, which provides that ‘The 
owner of the copyright in a work of any description has the exclusive right to do the acts specified in Chapter II 
as the acts restricted by the copyright in a work of that description’ (Author’s emphasis). 
36 U.S Department of Commerce, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, (9th Edition) (2014), Chapter 301.01: 
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s301.html> 
37 Jesse Wall, Being and Owning, (Oxford: OUP, 2015) p.20 
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can be categorised as ‘property rights’38 (though this position has attracted much academic 
criticism).39  
The assertion that the ius quod ad res pertinet is only concerned with res corporales is 
not borne out by a true translation of res. In the second paragraph of De Rebus Incorporalibus, 
Justinian states ‘Incorporales autem sunt, quae tangi non possunt. Qualia sunt ea, quae in iure 
consistunt: sicut hereditas, usus fructus, obligationes quoquo modo contractae’.40 This can be 
translated as ‘[M]oreover, there are incorporeal [things], which are not capable of being 
touched. Such things exist by law [or ‘the law’s authority’]: such as inheritance, usufruct and 
obligations, however these are acquired.’ Accordingly, in both English law and the classical 
Roman law, the analysis that one who has ‘ownership’ has a ‘right in a thing’ holds true in 
relation to both corporeal and incorporeal things (though the ‘right of ownership’ itself is 
incapable of being ‘owned’).41 
Professor MacCormick consequently conceived of ‘things’ as either corporeal or 
incorporeal objects which are ‘durable’ – extant in time, even if they have no relative physical 
dimension in space – and which exist separately from and independent of other objects and 
persons.42 It is clear, however, that ‘persons’ must be given a restricted meaning here, as is 
evinced by the fact that, in Scots common law, pupil children – boys below the age of fourteen 
                                                            
38 OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21 
39 See the discussion in Jonathan Brown, Review of Persons, Parts & Property: How Should We Regulate 
Human Tissue in the 21st Century?, [2015] Med. L. Rev. Advance Access Published 6th May 2015, doi: 
10.1093/medlaw/fwv015 
40 J.B Moyle, Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiones, (3rd Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) p.217 
41 See George Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, (2007) Rabels Zeitschrift Vol 71 p.804, p.831 
42 Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory, (Oxford University Press, 2007) para.8.2 
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and girls below the age of twelve – are not imbued with legal personality or regarded as 
personas.43  
This state of affairs is explained by the etymology of the Latin word persona/personae, 
which declines to personas in the accusative. This word is something of a faux ami in the sense 
that, while it is analogous to ‘persons’ in a certain sense,44 in classical Latin the term was used 
to refer to a theatre mask, or an actor. It is used as such in the Institutes and the Corpus Iuris 
Civilis and thus the term must be understood as meaning ‘players in a law suit’ in Romanistic 
legal writing.45 The view that all persons were beings imbued with an intrinsic human dignity46 
did not gain prominence in law until the 14th century47 and the idea that natural rights (iura 
naturalia, as termed by Grotius) were imparted on individuals at birth was all but unknown 
until the early modern period.48 Indeed, legal citizenship was a rarity in Gaius’ day; it did not 
become universal until the passing of an imperial edict in 212CE.49 
Everything which had a physical existence could be recognised as a ‘thing’ by the 
Roman law.50 Human beings – whether free or enslaved – were considered res: ‘Corporales 
                                                            
43 Scottish Law Commission Report on Child Abduction, February 1987; Patrick Fraser and James Clark, A 
Treatise on the Law of Scotland relative to Parent and Child and Guardian and Ward, (3rd Edition) (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1906) p.204 
44 Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) p.60 
45 Laurent L.J.M Waelkens, Medieval Family and Marriage Law: From Actions of Status to Legal Doctrine, in 
John W. Cairns and Paul J. du Plessis (eds.), The Creation of the Ius Commune: From Casus to Regula, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010) 
46 The Roman law protected the corpus, fama and dignitas of citizens (by means of the actio iniuriarum), but 
not every human being was a Roman citizen. Thus, though ‘dignity’ was recognised by the Romans, ‘human 
dignity’ was an alien concept. Slaves were regarded as res – any protections that they enjoyed extended from the 
limits placed on the dominium of the slave’s dominus.  
47 A. Lefebvre-Teillard, Introduction Historique au Droit des Personnes et de la Famille, (1996) 41-43 
48 H. Grotius, De Iure Belli Ac Pacis, I.iv.4, ed B.J.A de Kanter-van Hettinga Tromp (1939; new edition with 
notes by R. Feenstra, 1993) p.31. The idea that human beings hold inherent moral worth is even more modern; 
this notion appears to be wholly Kantian: Christopher Berry Gray, The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia , 
Vol. I (New York and London: Garland, 1999) p.208 
49 Dig. 4.1.4 
50 J. Inst.2.2.12 
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eae sunt quae sui natura tangi possunt: veluti fundus, homo, vestis, aurum, argentum et denique 
aliae res innumerabiles’. (‘Corporeal things are those which are tangible by nature, such as 
farmland, human beings, clothes, gold, silver, and other innumerable things’).51 This 
elucidation of res corporales and res incorporales – termed the ‘Gaian schema’ by Professor 
Gretton52 – informs the fundamental understanding of ‘property’ in the Common law, the 
Civilian tradition and in contemporary mixed legal systems.53 The recognition of legal 
personality does not, therefore, negate the possibility that the person’s body may be considered 
a ‘thing’ for the purposes of law, in spite of MacCormick’s claim; the significance (or 
otherwise) of personality, as it pertains to property law, is left to be determined by the 
peculiarities of any particular legal system. 
Just as a legal system may choose to recognise an intangible object as a legally 
significant this, so too may the law choose to recognise a res corporalis as something more 
than a ‘mere thing’, or to deny that a res corporales is, in fact, a thing.54 The German 
Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch expressly provides that animals are not things,55 in spite of the fact 
that they have a corporeal existence. Similarly, the English common law maintains that there 
is ‘no property in a corpse’,56 which implicitly denies that corpses are ‘things’ for the purposes 
of law. It is therefore apparent that an element of legal recognition is necessary to establish that 
an object is a ‘thing’ for the purposes of law. 
                                                            
51 J. Inst.2.2.12 
52 George Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007] Rabels Zeitschrift Vol 71 803 
53 George Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, [2007] Rabels Zeitschrift Vol 71 803, passim 
54 To use the words of Professor T.B Smith in Law, Professional Ethics and the Human Body, [1959] SLT 
(News) 245 
55 § 90a Tiere: ‘Tiere sind keine Sachen’ 
56 See the discussion in Imogen Goold and Murieann Quigley, Human Biomaterials: The Case for a Property 
Approach, in Imogen Goold, Kate Greasley, Jonathan Herring and Loane Skene, Persons, Parts and Property: 
How Should We Regulate Human Tissue in the 21st Century?, (Hart, 2014) at p.238 
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‘Property’ gains significance only insofar as it is recognised by the laws of the State.57 
Since the concept of ‘property’ is inherently bound to the regulation of things, it is clear that 
‘things’ are significant within the context of ‘property law’ insofar as they are recognised as 
‘things’ by the authority of the positive law. Accordingly, a ‘thing’ may be defined, in law, as 
an object which is both ‘durable’, to use MacCormick’s phraseology, and legally recognised 
and considered a res or ‘thing’ iure – by law or by the law’s authority.  
The notion that Scots law considers children to be ‘property’ encounters some notable 
problems. The judgement in the early case of Reid v Scot of Hardin states quite plainly that 
‘mothers cannot sell their bairns’.58 In spite of Scotland’s jurisdictional link to the Roman law 
(particularly in the area of corporeal moveable property)59 and the nature of the Romanistic 
pater familias,60 there is nothing to suggest that Scottish fathers have ever been imbued with 
the legal authority to do this where mothers have not. The law grants neither parent the 
authority to sell their children. The fact that Scottish parents have no commercium – the ability 
to sell or otherwise alienate – in relation to their children may suggest, prima facie, that the 
proprietary relationship between parent and child lacks a salient (some might even say an 
essential) feature of dominium, or ‘ownership’. This is not so; as shown above, one cannot look 
to the benefits which a person enjoys in respect of a thing in order to determine whether or not 
that object may be termed their property. One must, instead, look to the nature of the 
relationship between a thing and a legal person (or persons) in order to determine whether or 
not that thing is an object of property. 
                                                            
57 Gregory Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property, [2009] Cornell L. Rev. 745, p.748 
58 1688 (Mor. 9505) 
59 David L. Carey-Miller and David Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, (2nd Edition) (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 2005) para.8.01 
60 Carlos Amunategui Perello, Problems Concerning Familia in Early Rome, [2008] Roman Legal Tradition 37 
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A thing does not necessarily need to have a commercial value, or be held by a legal 
person in private patrimony in order to have a proprietary characteristic.61 The law may 
recognise that certain things are governed by property law, although they are incapable of being 
lawfully sold,62  alienated,63 or appropriated.64 This idea lies at the heart of ‘property’ in the 
Corpus Iuris Civile; Justinian divided the ius quod ad res pertinent in two, asserting that some 
things could be held as an object of private ownership while some things could not be. The 
former were termed res in nostro patrimonio while the latter were designated res extra nostrum 
patrimonium.65  
Gaius dispensed with the distinction between these two categories of things rather 
quickly, ruling that the divide was simply one between things governed by the ius humani and 
the ius divini respectively.66 Justinian, conversely, subdivided res extra nostrum patrimonium 
further, stating that res communes, res publicae, res universitatis and res divini iuris were all 
extra nostrum patrimonium.67 The early Scottish institutional writers adopted, developed and 
made use of the Justinianic rerum divisione; however, the practical significance of the division 
began to fade in both Mixed and Civilian jurisdictions as the importance placed on the category 
res communes declined.68  
                                                            
61 Rudloph Sohm, James Crawford Ledlie, Bernhard Erwin Grueber, The Institutes of Roman Law, (Gorgias 
Press, 2002) p.225 
62 University of Edinburgh v Presbytery of Edinburgh (1890) 28 S.L. Rep. 567: as per Lord Wellwood at p.573. 
63 Dig. 20.3.1.2 
64 George Mousourakis, Fundamentals of Roman Private Law, (Berlin: Springer, 2012) p.120 
65 J.B Moyle, Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiones, (3rd Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) p.197 
66 Gai. Inst. I, 8 
67 J. Inst.2.2.12 
68 Jill J. Robbie, Private Water Rights in Scots Law, [2012] PhD Thesis, Edinburgh University, p.34 
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With that said, the division does remain relevant in contemporary legal practice, to at 
least some extent.69 As well as recognising that some things were incapable of being held as 
private property, the Roman law also recognised that some res were economically valueless 
and, though able to be held in the patrimony of a persona, incapable of alienation.70 Although 
the Romanistic division of things has fallen out of fashion, the existence of this category of 
things has evidently retained its relevance in modern Scottish law as the doctrine of res extra 
commercium has featured in a recent Scottish Parliament consultation paper,71 wherein its 
continued existence is expressly noted.72 The doctrine was placed on a statutory footing by the 
schedule to the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973.73 
Things which fall within this category of res cannot be transferred into private hands.74 
Similarly, any rights enjoyed in respect of res extra commercium are imprescriptible.75 Such 
things are generally designated extra commercium as they are held by a public body for the 
public good,76 although private bodies or private individuals who hold certain res which are of 
public interest may similarly be prohibited from alienating property which they lawfully own.77 
In Scotland, ‘property’ cannot consequently be defined as a thing which forms a part of an 
individual’s patrimony, as it is for the Austrians,78 or as a thing with economic value; rather, 
‘property’ must be understood as a durable object which is recognised as, and termed, a ‘thing’ 
                                                            
69 The category of res divini iuris has some continued relevance as it pertains to the common-law crime of 
violation of sepulchre: See James Logie, Scots Law, in The Treatment of Human Remains in Archaeology, 
[2006] Historic Scotland Operational Policy Paper 5, p.19 
70 J.B Moyle, Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiones, (3rd Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) p.197 
71 Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (Scotland) Bill Consultation, (Scottish Parliament Publication, 
July 2015)  
72 Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (Scotland) Bill Consultation, (Scottish Parliament Publication, 
July 2015) para.2.40 
73 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 
74 Karl-Heinz Siehr, International Art Trade and The Law,  [1993] VI Receuil des Cours 9,82 
75 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 
76 University of Edinburgh v Presbytery of Edinburgh (1890) 28 S.L. Rep. 567: as per Lord Wellwood at p.573. 
77 Karl-Heinz Siehr, International Art Trade and The Law,  [1993] VI Receuil des Cours 9,82 
78 §353 Allegemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
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by law,79 or as a legally recognised proprietary relationship (such as dominium)80 between a 
thing and a natural or artificial legal person.81 
It is submitted that if a relationship between a person and a thing is given legal 
protection, then that relationship must necessarily be considered proprietary. Numerous private 
law doctrines offer remedies to those who suffer loss or damage in respect of their property;82 
similarly, the criminal law evidently seeks to protect the integrity of proprietary relationships 
by threat of legal sanction. It imposes such sanctions for conduct which interferes with a 
proprietor’s enjoyment of their thing and prohibits actions such as wilful fire-raising, malicious 
mischief and theft.83 These actions are each species of a genus of crime; they can each be 
termed ‘crimes against property’, in contrast to ‘crimes against the person’.84 The division of 
crimes highlights the fact that crimes against the person pertain directly to the victim affected, 
while crimes against property necessarily involve a separate ‘thing’ which is, in some way, 
related to the victim.85 A victim of assault, therefore, suffers as the subject of an attack on their 
bodily integrity. A victim of theft is regarded as the subject of a theft as, by dint of this crime, 
they lose the enjoyment of their property or possession. The piece of property, or the 
possession, is the object of the crime. It is not the subject of it.    
                                                            
79 Thus, property may be corporeal or incorporeal: Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal 
Theory, (Oxford University Press, 2007) para.8.2 
80 ‘Ownership’ can be better understood as a relationship which gives rise to real rights than as a ‘real right’ 
itself: See the discussion in John Rankine, The Law of Land Ownership in Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. 
Green, 1909), p.99 
81 John Rankine, The Law of Land Ownership in Scotland, (4th Ed.) (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1909), pp.99-100 
82 Joe Thomson, Delictual Liability, (5th Edition) Chapter 1 (C) 
83 Sir Gerald H. Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (3rd Edition) Vol. II (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2001) 
84 See, for example, the Visiting Forces Act 1952 c.67, s.3 
85 Gwynne Nettler, Explaining Crime, (Michigan: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1984), passim 
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In England and Wales, the crime of theft is codified in the Theft Act 1968.86 In Scotland, 
theft of corporeal property is a crime at common law.87 Any such object or thing may be stolen 
according to Scots law and the object of theft needn’t necessarily be a piece of private property; 
one may steal things which would be considered res publicae, extra commercium or extra 
nostrum patrimonium by the ius privatum. In the words of the Institutional writer Burnett, 
‘everything that is moveable may be the subject of theft, whether it is moveable property strictly 
so called, or made moveable by the act and deed of the away taker’.88 Thus, even heritable 
property may be the object of theft if the thief separates the thing from the land to which it is 
affixed. Both publically owned and privately owned things may be stolen; a thing need not be 
held in private patrimony to be the object of a theft.89 The unlawful appropriation of things 
which cannot lawfully be sold (or, indeed, lawfully possessed), such as controlled drugs would 
likely be actionable as theft in Scotland; indeed, there is precedent for this in English law.90 It 
is clear that, in Scotland, theft is committed when a thing is stolen, whatever that thing may be. 
The actus reus of theft is no longer the ‘away-taking’ of a thing, as it was in the time 
of Burnett and Hume.91 The salient feature of theft is now appropriation of a thing.92 One may 
commit theft by depriving an owner or custodian of the control and possession of the thing in 
any manner; there is now no need to physically remove the object or to carry it off.93 The exact 
mens rea requirement of theft is now subject to some academic debate, but it is nevertheless 
clear that an intention to deprive the proprietor (or the holder) of the enjoyment of their thing 
                                                            
86 c.60 
87 See Stuart P. Green, Theft by Omission, in James Chalmers, Fiona Leverick and Lindsay Farmer (Eds.) Essays 
in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon, (Edinburgh: EUP, 2010) p.161 
88 John Burnett, A Treatise on the Various Branches of the Criminal Law of Scotland (Edinburgh: George 
Ramsey and Company, 1811), 124 
89 Ibid. 
90 R v. Adam Mark Dyer [2007] EWCA Crim 90 
91 John Smith (1838) 2 Swin. 28  
92 See O’Brien v Strathern 1922 JC at 57 
93 Carmichael v Black; Carmichael v Penrice 1992 SCCR 709, per Lord Justice-General Hope at 719A 
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is required.94 Each side in the debate accepts this; the controversy arises as it is not clear if the 
thief must intend to deprive the proprietor permanently, or if intent to temporarily deprive the 
proprietor is sufficient.95 
As the existence of a legally recognised ‘thing’ is essential in Scottish property law 
(indeed, it may be argued, all property law), the law must recognise the existence of a ‘thing’ 
in order to categorise a crime against property. The crime of plagium is specifically listed as 
an offence against property in the schedule to the Visiting Forces Act 1952.96 It appears here 
alongside other aggravated forms of theft97 (and the crime of theft itself). Indeed, the crime of 
plagium has now been framed as a crime against property for centuries.98 Hume stated that the 
crime has its roots in the Romanistic crimen plagii,99 which he (and later Scottish writers)100 
defined as ‘the stealing of a human creature’.101 This implies that the relationship between 
guardian and child is proprietary, as well as familial. 
The later jurist Burnett noted that the language of furtum hominis – ‘man-stealing’ – is 
common to ‘the laws of most states’,102 however he also recognised that this designation is a 
misnomer, noting that as there is ‘no property’ in ‘human creatures’,103 such creatures cannot 
                                                            
94 The purpose and temporal duration for which an accused person need deprive a proprietor of their thing in 
order to display the requisite mens rea of theft are the points of contention: See Andrew M. Cubie, Scots 
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95 Sheriff Andrew Cubie, Scots Criminal Law, (3rd Edition) para.14.1 
96 At para.4(a) 
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98 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting the Description and Punishment of Crimes, 
(Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1797),  p.84 
99 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting the Description and Punishment of Crimes, 
(Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1797),  p.84 
100 John Erskine, The Principles of the Law of Scotland, in the Order of Sir George Mackenzie's Institutions of 
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102 Ibid. 
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away-taking of a corpse was competently charged as theft. 
16 
 
be properly termed the object of a theft.104 This claim is not borne out by later authority, which 
expresses that plagium is no more than an aggravated form of theft105 and that children can, 
therefore, be termed the objects of theft whenever a charge of plagium is held to be 
competent.106 Indeed, in the case of Downie v HMA,107 both counsel for the Crown and for the 
defence conceded that children were to be regarded as property in Scots law; their dispute 
concerned in whom the proprietary right in the child was vested, not whether or not it was 
appropriate to regard the child as a mere thing.108  
This later authority (and indeed, Burnett’s description of plagium) does not accurately 
reflect the operation of the crimen plagii. Nor does the description of plagium elucidated by 
Hume represent a true account of the Roman law. The rules pertaining to the operation of the 
Roman crimen plagii were set out in the Lex Fabia.109 This penal statute unequivocally 
criminalised the kidnapping of men, women and children alike, as well as proscribing the act 
of treating a free man as a slave and the act of convincing a slave to leave their master.110 In 
later Roman law, the definition of plagium expanded to cover the act of treating a free man as 
the object of a transaction.111 Those who committed any of these actions could be subjected to 
the death penalty.112 
PLAGIUM 
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112 Dig. 48.15; Cod.9.20; Danilo Ceccarelli Morolli, A Brief Outline of Roman Law, (Gangemi, 2012) p.112 
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Plagium, Crimen Plagii and Deprivation of Liberty 
The crimen plagii was not a crime which necessarily involved property; it primarily 
concerned legally illegitimate actions taken against individuals who were recognised, by law, 
as persons.113 The Roman law recognised that free individuals had interests in their corpus, 
fama and dignitas114 and protected such interests by way of both the ius privatum and ius 
publicae. The crimen plagii generally involved an infringement of a free individual’s interest 
in their corpus. 
In modern terms, the crimen plagii could, in theory, be categorised as a crime against 
the person, although one ought not to embark on this endeavour as to term it such is to 
anachronistically superimpose a modern idea onto a framework wherein that idea has no place. 
The dangers of making use of this anachronism can be observed in consideration of other 
elements of the crime, as the crimen plagii could involve an item of property, such as in 
instance in which a perpetrator enticed a slave to leave their dominus. In addition, though the 
crimen plagii primarily pertained to the abduction of free persons, the law also penalised the 
kidnapping of slaves.115  
There is a clear link between the Roman crimen plagii and the Scottish concept of 
plagium; Hume was correct in this assertion. The Fabian law was clearly received into the 
Continental European legal tradition, with which Scots law shares its common heritage.116 
From this reception, the ius commune constructed a sub-category of the delict iniuria (or rather, 
                                                            
113 Danilo Ceccarelli Morolli, A Brief Outline of Roman Law, (Gangemi, 2012) p.112 
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specifically, sub-categories of iniuria realis),117 which sought to protect an individual’s interest 
in their own personal freedom and liberty.118 An individual’s interest in their own liberty was 
initially protected as all lieges of Scotland were ‘the King’s free [men]’119 and the law 
considered that to deprive such a person of their liberty was an attack on, and affront to, the 
Crown’s authority.120 By the 17th century, however, the law began to develop, with Stair, a 
more theoretical view of the concept of ‘liberty’ which was underpinned by Christian 
(Calvinist) theology.121 
The sub-category of delict pertaining to the protection of the individual’s liberty 
included raptus, plagium and the crimen privati carceris. The crimen privati carceris was 
based on the Roman law which prohibited the detention of free subjects,122 rather than the 
crimen plagii of the Lex Fabia, which, as noted, concerned forcible abduction. Raptus and 
plagium both initially concerned ‘forcible abduction’ in Scots law and so were directly linked 
to the crimen plagii. The term ‘forcible’ was given a wide meaning by the law; it was not 
understood as a necessarily violent act,123 but in fact included enticement and seduction (i.e., 
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such charges were relevant where “the defender intyset and seducet” the victim),124 per the 
authority of the ius commune jurists.125 
Charges of raptus and plagium could be brought alongside that of crimen privati 
carceris.126 The victim, in a case of plagium, did not necessarily have to be a child.127 Although 
raptus could contemporaneously be understood as the sexual offence of rape,128 raptus and 
ravishment were not confined to cases in which sexual intercourse (forced or consensual) 
occurred;129 indeed, they were not, until MacKenzie,130 confined to cases in which the victim 
was female.131 In practical terms, plagium and raptus were identical,132 although some scholars 
did debate whether or not libidinis causa was an essential element of raptus,133 until a 1616 
case explicitly ruled that it was not.134 
It is apparent that plagium was not necessarily a proprietary offence in the 16th or 17th 
centuries, but rather it could be a delict committed against a person’s interests in their personal 
integrity.135 Thus, it is clear that neither the Romans nor the early Scots lawyers regarded 
plagium as a purely proprietary crime or wrong; the taxonomy of ‘crimes against property’ and 
‘crimes against the person’ have no place here. With that said, just as the delict of raptus 
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evolved into a sexual offence gradually, after MacKenzie’s discussion on ‘matters criminal’ 
asserted that the wrong necessarily involved libidinis causa,136 so too did plagium begin to 
evolve into an exclusively proprietary crime through the course of the eighteenth century.137 
With the passing of the Act anent Wrongous Imprisonment138 (which remains in force and is 
contemporaneously termed the Criminal Procedure Act 1701),139 the Court of Session began 
to exercise jurisdiction over matters of iniuria pertaining to the protection of personal liberty.140 
The Justiciary courts retained jurisdiction over instances of plagium and raptus.  
The case of Helen Torrence and John Waldie141 appears to have marked the inception 
of plagium as a crime purely concerned with property. Here, the indictment charged the two 
co-accused with plagium, framed as ‘the stealing or away-taking of a living child’, who was, 
at the time of the crime, nine years old.142 At first instance and on appeal, the perpetrators were 
ultimately convicted of theft as a result of this charge.143 In the words of the defender’s Counsel 
(Muirhead)144 in the nineteenth century case of Mary Millar or Oates,145 “Torrence and Waldie 
a very peculiar case; for there the child stolen actually became a thing while still in the hands 
of the men who stole it”146 as, after committing the crime of plagium by stealing away the child, 
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the co-accused jointly murdered him and sold his corpse to a group of surgeons for lucre.147 
The defence in Mary Millar sought to argue that a living ten year old child could not be 
categorised as a ‘thing’ by law, but they clearly (indeed, expressly) accepted that the corpse of 
such a child could clearly be considered a mere thing, or ‘property’148 and that infant children 
are to be regarded as pieces of property.149  
The salient point of Muirhead’s argument stood against the eighteenth century 
authority. The authority of, and reasoning in, Torrence and Waldie may be dubious, per 
Muirhead’s later submissions (although such a challenge may be repelled by the fact that the 
relevant charge therein was of ‘stealing the child’ and ‘soon thereafter delivering its body, then 
dead, to some surgeons’,150 indicating both that the charge of theft was relevant before the child 
was murdered and that the court considered both the living and dead body of the child to be a 
‘thing’ in the eyes of the law),151 but it is plainly evident that after Hume penned his 
authoritative treatise on crimes, plagium was imbued, necessarily, with a proprietary 
characteristic. The extant 19th century authorities display, overwhelmingly, that plagium is a 
crime against property. The crime has retained this characteristic well into the 21st century.  
Plagium as a Crime Against Property 
Hume categorised plagium as a crime against property since children ‘have no will of 
their own’152 and so can properly be said to be in the possession or patrimony of their parents.153 
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The Scottish courts have never enthusiastically endorsed this state of affairs, however, the 
judiciary has repeatedly reaffirmed that it is factually accurate to consider children ‘property’ 
for the purposes of criminal law.154 In the 1808 case of Rachel Wright, Lord Justice-Clerk 
Granton expressed the view that he was ‘not yet convinced… that a child is not the property of 
its parents’ before expressly (and, by his own admission, proudly)155 affirming that ‘[plagium] 
is a species of theft and rightly classed under that name’.156 
Later authorities have vindicated Lord Granton’s claims. In Hamilton v Mooney,157 
Sheriff McKay affirmed the relevance of a charge of plagium as it pertained to the theft of a 
child from its mother. In doing so, he stated: 
‘For something to be stolen it must belong to someone, is the definition of theft in its 
purest sense… Modern writers confirm and the old authorities agree that for the purposes of 
theft a child is regarded as being the property of its parents. It is trite law that plagium is a 
crime in Scotland. My considered view is that plagium is the depriving of the custodier or 
rightful possessor of his child.’158 
In 2004, the High Court of Justiciary Appeal Court similarly held, per curiam, that 
‘plagium is an aggravated form of theft’.159 The charge of plagium was not libelled in that case, 
however, and the court ultimately ruled that it could be appropriate to bring a charge of 
abduction instead of one of plagium.160  
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The similarity between plagium and abduction has long been recognised. In Mary 
Millar or Oates, the panel had been severally charged with both plagium and ‘the wicked and 
felonious abduction from its parents of a female child under the age of puberty’.161 Counsel for 
the defence argued that a child of ten years old could not be considered an ‘infant child’ with 
‘no will of its own’ as it was, at common law, capax doli and so the charge of plagium was 
incompetent.162 With that said, he was, however, forced to concede that in the earlier cases of 
Smith163 and Margaret MacMillan or Branaghan164 children who could not be considered 
‘infant’ on his construction of the term had been competently charged with the crime.165 
The appellate court ultimately rejected the panel’s submission and held that the consent 
of a child to its own theft was immaterial. Only the consent of the parents was germane. This 
decision, in effect, ruled that a pupil child, as an ‘infant’, has no will of its own for the purposes 
of law. The charge of plagium – framed as the theft of the child – was held to be relevant per 
curiam and the panel was convicted by jury, although the alternative charge of abduction was 
ultimately withdrawn by the Crown.166  
The defence had argued that abduction was no more than an English legal importation 
which was ‘not a nomen juris in the law of Scotland and was unknown in the law of Rome’. As 
a result of this, they submitted that such a charge was irrelevant.167 Lords Cowan and Ardmillan 
did not go so far as to agree with counsel; they did not expressly rule the charge irrelevant. 
They did, however, venture to criticise the utility of the abduction charge; Lord Cowan opined 
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that its purpose and use was of dubious assistance and Lord Ardmillan noted that it ‘did not 
raise anything not covered by the charge of plagium’ and so, in his view, ‘an alternative charge 
of that sort ought to be avoided’.168 Lord Ivory went further than both of his colleagues and 
expressly stated that, in the absence of fuller argument, he considered the charge of abduction 
to be completely irrelevant.169 
The preference for charges of plagium over those of abduction in the 19th century has 
been reversed in modern law. The courts of the 21st century have sought to distance themselves 
from that crime and have generally eschewed any opportunity to make use of it where it has 
been possible to do so. In Orr v K,170 the Sheriff held that although the law pertaining to 
plagium had not been abrogated, the accused could not be competently charged with that crime 
in that particular dispute as she enjoyed parental rights under section 3 (1) (a) of the Children 
(Scotland) Act 1995. In the Sheriff’s view, section 11 of the 1995 Act had created a civil law 
framework and so it was for the civil, not the criminal, courts to remediate the dispute between 
mother and father.171 
Even when faced with instances in which a charge of plagium may be competent, the 
courts have attempted to avoid enjoining the necessary consequences of the crime by utilising 
different strands of law to achieve the same eventual outcome. Indeed, if the case of Mary 
Millar were to be heard today, it is quite likely that the charge of abduction would be given 
greater weight than that of plagium. As noted, the court in Brouillard v HMA ruled that it was 
competent to bring a charge of abduction in place of a charge of plagium,172 which ostensibly 
stands against the authority of Mary Millar. This had previously been affirmed, implicitly, in 
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both Anderson v HMA173 and M v HMA.174 In SB v HMA,175 the court ruled that, ‘although in 
certain situations, a person abducting a pupil child may be charged with theft of that child 
(plagium), limited assistance can be derived from decisions on that crime given its association 
with rights of ownership and property’.176 
The distaste expressed for the implications of plagium by Lord Carloway does not 
dispense with them. It is important to note that the charge of abduction simply serves as an 
alternative to one of plagium; issues of property and ownership are still relevant in relation to 
children and they shall continue to be until the crime of plagium is expressly abrogated. The 
court in Brouillard expressly affirmed that the question of the child’s consent is irrelevant in a 
charge of plagium;177 the law consequently continues to deny children their agency in this 
context. It also continues to frame the crime as one committed against one with parental rights, 
with the child reduced to a mere indirect, incidental object. Brouillard affirmed this as well, 
citing the ratio of (then) Lord Justice-General Hope from the case of Hamilton v Wilson: 
‘[Plagium is] the deliberate taking of a child from the custody of a parent or other 
person who has for the time being the parental right of custody in terms of the statute [the 
Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 1986] or under an order made by the 
court’.178  
As such, it is clear that, as of 2015, there remains binding judicial precedent in Scotland 
which expressly recognises that a child is the mere object of a charge of plagium. The 
‘custodier’ is wronged by the act, not the directly affected child. Brouillard has confirmed that 
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the charge is ‘rightly’, to use the words of Lord Justice-Clerk Granton,179 classified as theft 
within the taxonomy of crime180 and so, since an object must be property to be the object of a 
theft,181 it is clear that children are classified as ‘property’ and consequently as ‘things’ within 
the context of Scottish criminal law.     
Accordingly, it is submitted that it is plainly evident that there are a plethora of 
problems with plagium, particularly as the crime is contemporaneously conceptualised in 
Scottish legal thought. In order to solve these problems, one may suggest that it would be best 
for plagium to return to its Romanistic and early Scottish roots; that Scottish legal scholars and 
commentators ought to reframe all discourse surrounding the crime and conceptualise it as one 
which pertains to personality as opposed to property. This is not possible; as Lord Carloway 
notes, the crime is now essentially bound up in the notion of property and proprietorship.182 
Plagium may be an ‘archaic and somewhat anomalous crime’,183 but one cannot swim against 
the overwhelming tide of judicial authority which has developed since Torrence and Waldie.184 
Alternatively, one may suggest that, since the crime of abduction is akin to plagium in 
all material respects, it would be best for Scottish prosecutors to simply eschew the use of 
indictments for plagium in instances where a child is kidnapped and substitute the charge of 
abduction in its place. As the existence of plagium is recognised by statute, this is not a 
satisfactory solution.185 It is submitted that it is unlikely that a crime which has been given 
Parliamentary recognition can fall into desuetude by simple lack of citation. Similarly, since 
                                                            
179 Rachel Wright (1808) Burnett App. VII 
180 Brouillard v H.M.A (2004) JC 176, para.19 
181 Hamilton v Mooney 1990 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 105, p.108 
182 [2015] HCJAC 56, para.31 
183 Sir Gerald Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland, (Second Edition), (Edinburgh: W. Green, 1978), para 29-
52 
184 (1752) Maclaurin, 152 
185 Visiting Forces Act 1952 c.67,  Schedule para.4(a) 
27 
 
plentiful and recent common law authority recognises the continued existence of the crime, it 
remains significant in Scottish jurisprudence. If the law is to be regarded as having an 
‘expressive function’,186 then the law of Scotland expresses a rather unsavoury statement by 
continuing to recognise the crime and, by implication, its resultant consequences.    
In the 1987 Scottish Law Commission Report on Child Abduction,187 the authors noted 
that, after inviting views on what ought to be the future of the crime of plagium, the majority 
of respondents to the Commission’s memorandum favoured the complete abrogation of the 
crime.188  A significant point of concern arose, in the Commission’s view, since ‘as a result of 
the concept of ownership or possession of the child by the parent’, the question ‘as to whether 
the crime of plagium can be committed by a parent’ was left broadly unanswered (save for the 
then recent and untested authority in Downie)189 and, resultantly, the law was unclear.190  
That this point is clarified by later case law191 is no reason to eschew the Commission’s 
recommendation, however; the Commission also expressly criticised the fact that the approach 
of the law pertaining to plagium was ‘still based on the question of whether the parent had any 
rights in the child rather than on the interests of the child’.192 It is submitted that in any legal 
regime (such as that of 21st century Scotland) wherein the welfare of the child is the paramount 
concern in any legal case in which they are involved,193 the Commission’s concerns ought to 
carry even greater weight. If the child were the subject of the crime of plagium, the courts 
would be obliged to consider the child’s rights, interests and views if a decision as to the child’s 
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custody were ultimately to be made.194 As it stands, since the child is a mere object, there is no 
obligation to do so; plagium only accounts for the immediate custodian’s rights and interests.195 
The issue of ‘pupillarity’ also caused the Commission concern.196 They submitted that 
the fact that boys and girls ceased to be regarded as ‘pupils’ at different ages was not in line 
with the fact that the law, at the time of the report, treated all those under sixteen as children 
and that pupillarity had no real practical application.197 As a possibility, they suggested that if 
plagium were to remain a part of Scots law, then the crime ought to apply to children of either 
gender who are under the age of sixteen.198 This possibility was expressly rejected when the 
Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Bill was debated in Parliament199 and the Age of Legal 
Capacity (Scotland) Act expressly states that nothing therein affects the criminal or delictual 
responsibility of ‘any person’.200 
It is consequently apparent that the continued existence of the crime of plagium stands 
even more at odds with contemporary thinking than it did when the Law Commission levelled 
this accusation at it in 1987. The law presently recognises that ‘infant’ pupil children may have 
a will of their own for the purposes of the civil and criminal law; as noted at the start of this 
chapter, the civil law affords all children some contractual capacity,201 decision making 
capacity in relation to medical treatment202 and the ability to instruct a solicitor.203 It also grants 
testamentary capacity to pupil boys, since everyone in Scotland is imbued with such capacity 
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after attaining the age of twelve,204 yet boys do not cease to be pupils until the age of fourteen. 
Pupil children of both sexes are capax doli for some years before their pupillage ends, as, at 
present, the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland remains set at eight. 
As a result of this, there is one particular concern which can be raised with the recent 
calls to reform the age of criminal responsibility in Scotland.205 For as long as plagium remains 
a crime in the law of Scotland, the law implicitly expresses the view that a child has ‘no will of 
its own’, as a result of the law’s expressive function. It is consequently submitted that, if 
Parliament is indeed to raise the age of criminal responsibility, it should also take the 
opportunity to abrogate the crime of plagium and make clear that, while the law does not 
recognise that children possess full decision-making capacity, it nevertheless views their rights, 
interests and welfare as paramount. If the law pertaining to plagium is not reformed when this 
change is made, the argument that the law considers children no more than mere ‘things’ gains 
strength.    
CONCLUSION 
From the above, it is ultimately clear that Scots law recognises that children may be 
stolen. ‘For something to be stolen it must belong to someone, [that] is the definition of theft in 
its purest sense’.206 Things which the law recognises as belonging to persons may be termed 
‘property’ and the relationship between a person and a thing may similarly be termed 
‘proprietary’ if it is given legal protection. In Scotland, ‘property law is the law of things’;207 
the rights or obligations which may arise in relation to property are not indicative of the nature 
of ‘property’, they are simply incidental consequences which arise as a result of the relationship 
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between the proprietor and the thing which the proprietor claims to own. In defining ‘property’ 
within the Scottish context, it is therefore pertinent only to consider if the object of the property 
right which is claimed is regarded as a ‘thing’ by law and if the person who asserts that they 
have ‘ownership’ of it is authorised to do. 
The word ‘thing’ can be interpreted, in the legal context, as a tangible or intangible 
object which is ‘durable’ and separate from other things and personas, per Professor 
MacCormick, but only if they are also granted legal significance and recognition by law. The 
positive law can choose to create res incorporales; intangible things, such as personal rights,208 
which exist only as juristic creations. Equally, it can choose to deny that res corporales are 
‘things’ for the purposes of law, in spite of their existence as physical objects. 
Scots law does not deny that the bodies of children, whether living or dead, have a 
proprietary nature. Since the common law denies the personality of children and the criminal 
law regards them as property, so too must it be concluded that the law necessarily regards them 
as ‘mere things’, regardless of the fact that it currently recognises that they may have a will of 
their own and may be the subject, as well as the object, of rights. The common law and statute 
both currently understand plagium as a crime against property, in spite of the fact that the roots 
of the crime lie primarily in the protection of personality and liberty. 
The courts have, in the 21st century, indicated that they are uncomfortable with the 
continued existence of the crime of plagium. Its links to questions of property and ownership 
render it ‘of limited assistance’ to any tribunal which is faced with an instance of abduction or 
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what may be broadly termed ‘abduction’.209 With that said, the crime still influences Scottish 
jurisprudence and its resultant implications reverberate through the law. Since plagium is 
framed as a crime against property, the interests of custodians is protected above those of the 
child.    
It is ultimately submitted that if the Scottish legal system truly seeks to place the welfare 
of the child as the paramount consideration in any case which involves a child, the crime of 
plagium must be abolished. This matter is particularly pressing if the Scottish Parliament is, 
indeed, to the age of criminal responsibility. While the reasons for possibly enacting this 
change are good and, indeed, there are legally and ethical sound, progressive reasons to ensure 
that vulnerable children are spared the vicissitudes of the criminal justice system, for as long 
as plagium remains a recognised crime, the law of Scotland expresses an unduly possessive 
and paternalistic attitude towards children. The crime of plagium was imbued with a 
proprietary characteristic in respect of children because children were seen as having ‘no will 
of their own’ in the eighteenth century.210 There is absolutely no reason for the law of the 21st 
century to continue to enjoin this idea and so, this article submits, the crime of plagium ought 
to be abolished. 
 
                                                            
209 SB v HMA [2015] HCJAC 56, para.20 
210 David Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting the Description and Punishment of Crimes, 
(Edinburgh: Bell and Bradfute, 1797),  p.84 
